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INTRODUCTION 
According to the Declaration of Independence, “all men are created equal 
. . . endowed, by their Creator, with certain unalienable rights . . . [including] 
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life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”1 This foundational document from 
1776 continues to resonate in our national consciousness. Yet at the time of the 
Declaration, over half a million people in the nascent United States did not en-
joy the right to liberty.2 Most of those people were enslaved through the system 
of chattel slavery.3 Many northern workers were also tied to their employers 
through the practice of peonage.4 For those people, liberty was an empty prom-
ise until after the Civil War, when the Thirteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution abolished both slavery and involuntary servitude.5 
Central to the Thirteenth Amendment’s promise of liberty is the right of 
workers to contract freely for their labor. This article explores what the right to 
contract meant to slaves, free blacks, and northern workers before and after the 
Civil War—to uncover the lost history of liberty of contract under the Thir-
teenth Amendment. Leaders of the Reconstruction Congress recognized that 
freed slaves, northern workers in debt peonage, and even early industrial work-
ers, were vulnerable to exploitation.6 To them, freedom of contract was not an 
end in itself; it was a means to the end of achieving equal citizenship and fun-
damental rights for freed slaves and empowering all workers to exercise more 
control over their working lives. The Reconstruction Congress regulated con-
tracts to prevent the exploitation of labor through practices reminiscent of slav-
ery.7 
The conventional model of liberty of contract is the individualist right to be 
free of government interference, embraced by the Supreme Court in Lochner v. 
New York.8 Indeed, Lochner has become an iconic case for libertarians and oth-
er scholars opposing economic regulation.9 Some scholars support the Loch-
                                                        
1  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
2  See The Constitution and Slavery, CONST. RTS. FOUND., http://www.crf-usa.org/black-histo 
ry-month/the-constitution-and-slavery [https://perma.cc/QF3B-4LEL] (last visited Jan. 14, 
2019); see also IRA BERLIN, MANY THOUSANDS GONE: THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES OF 
SLAVERY IN NORTH AMERICA 223–24 (1998). 
3  See Sanford Levinson, Slavery in the Canon of Constitutional Law, in SLAVERY & THE 
LAW 89, 94 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1997). 
4  ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN 
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 1350-1870 122 (1991). 
5  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
6  See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1571 (1867) (providing debates over the 1867 An-
ti-Peonage Act); see infra notes 274–89 and accompanying text. 
7  For example, the Reconstruction Congress regulated contracts with the 1868 Eight Hour 
Act, the 1867 Anti-Peonage Act and the 1866 Civil Rights Act. See Eight Hour Act, ch. 72, 
15 Stat. 77 (1868); Anti-Peonage Act, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867) (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–1585 (2012) and 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2012)); Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 
31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1983 (2012)); see also 
infra Section III.C. 
8  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905); see RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE 
LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 53, 55 (2014); see also Richard A. Ep-
stein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contracts Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 705 (1984). 
9  See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 8 (2011); see also CLINT BOLICK, DEATH GRIP: LOOSENING 
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nerian liberty of contract for normative reasons on the grounds that it furthers 
autonomy for workers.10 Others argue that the Court’s ruling in Lochner is con-
sistent with the understanding of liberty of contract during the Reconstruction 
Era and thus justified on originalist principles.11 This article focuses on the lat-
ter argument. A close examination of the antebellum and Reconstruction Era 
debates over liberty of contract reveals that the free labor ideology was more 
complex than most constitutional scholars have heretofore acknowledged.12 
This article shows, contrary to conventional wisdom, that the Thirteenth 
Amendment based right to contract does not bar government intervention. In-
stead, it invites government intervention to empower workers exercising that 
right. 
In the antebellum era, fugitive slaves and northern workers invoked the 
Declaration of Independence as they called for measures to end slavery and 
promote free labor.13 Antislavery activists developed a doctrine of labor which 
was premised on liberty of contract—the ability of a worker to freely contract 
with one’s employer and enjoy the fruits of his own labor.14 These activists de-
veloped different strands of thought on the meaning of liberty of contract. Mor-
al abolitionists, such as William Lloyd Garrison, believed that freedom of con-
tract was a value in and of itself.15 They sought government intervention solely 
to ensure that freed slaves could contract for their labor.16 Antislavery republi-
cans, however, developed a more robust model of liberty of contract, one that 
invoked state intervention to prevent private exploitation reminiscent of slavery 
and involuntary servitude.17 Those activists saw the end of slavery as part of a 
                                                                                                                                
THE LAW’S STRANGLEHOLD OVER ECONOMIC LIBERTY 46 (2011); Epstein, supra note 8, at 
732. 
10  See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 9, 16. 
11  See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 8, at 224; see also KEN I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL 
LIBERTIES: DISCONTINUITIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 188 
(2004) (arguing that freed slaves embraced an ideology of individualism, which flowed natu-
rally from the “individualist-oriented free labor ideology” of the antislavery cause, justifying 
an anti-statist approach to the regulation of contracts). 
12  But see William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the 
Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 769, 774 (1985) (describing divergent strands of free 
labor ideology in the Reconstruction Era). 
13  See, e.g., Address of the Colored National Convention to the People of the United States, 
Rochester, New York, July 6–8, 1853 in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS (13TH, 14TH & 
15TH): ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS VOLUME I 203 (Kurt T. Lash Ed.) (forthcoming 2019) (calling 
for “the blessing of liberty to all”); DAVID MONTGOMERY, BEYOND EQUALITY: LABOR AND 
THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS 1862-1872 238 (1st ed. 1967) (noting that Fincher’s Trade Re-
view masthead said “Eight Hours, A Legal Day’s Work for Freemen” demonstrating “[t]he 
struggle for shorter hours, in other words, was seen as a fight for the liberty of the worker.”). 
14  See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN 
PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 11 (1995). 
15  See AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND 
THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 20 (1998). 
16  See id. at 18, 35. 
17  See Forbath, supra note 12, at 777–78. 
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larger effort to enforce liberty for all workers.18 They sought an alliance with 
the nascent labor movement, which advocated its own version of liberty of con-
tract—freedom from undue coercion in the workplace.19 Both strands of the an-
tislavery movement influenced the Reconstruction Congress, but in that Con-
gress the broader, more substantive model of liberty of contract prevailed. 
Few members of the Reconstruction Congress adopted the narrower view 
of liberty of contract adopted by the Court in Lochner.20 The vast majority of 
members of that Congress understood that government intervention was neces-
sary to enable freed slaves to enter into contracts and enjoy the fruits of their 
own labor.21 They understood that slavery was a private relationship, albeit one 
with the imprimatur of the state.22 Thus, for the freed slave, liberty required 
much more than simple freedom of contract. The Reconstruction Congress en-
acted legislation to block contracts that interfered with freedom of labor be-
cause they understood that the mere formal right to contract was insufficient to 
ensure actual freedom.23 Moreover, the Reconstruction Congress invoked the 
Thirteenth Amendment as it intervened in employment contracts to protect not 
only the rights of newly freed slaves, but also the rights of northern workers.24 
The remainder of this article draws on the testimonies of fugitive slaves, 
free blacks, and northern workers to illustrate what liberty of contract meant to 
the people on the ground who sought its protection. Influenced by these people, 
antislavery activists developed a doctrine of free labor based on liberty of con-
tract. This article then explores the debates in the Reconstruction Congress 
when they enacted legislation to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment and protect 
liberty of contract. Those measures included: the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which 
established a right to contract free of racial discrimination; the 1867 Anti-
Peonage Act, which prohibits involuntary servitude for all workers; and the 
1868 Eight Hour Act, which limited the hours of work for federal workers to 
                                                        
18  See REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, THE FORGOTTEN EMANCIPATOR: JAMES MITCHELL ASHLEY AND 
THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF RECONSTRUCTION 66 (2018). 
19  See MONTGOMERY, supra note 13, at 114; see also ZIETLOW, supra note 18, at 46, 61. 
20  A few members of that Congress argued that the 1868 Eight Hour Act violated the right to 
contract, expressing a view similar to that of the Court in Lochner. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 
40th Cong., 1st Sess. 413 (1867) (documenting Senator William Pitt Fessenden’s objections 
to compelling everyone to abide by fixed hours of labor); see also CONG. GLOBE, 40th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 3426 (1868) (noting Representative Lot Morrill’s objections to limiting em-
ployment contracts, seeing them as a degradation against the working class). 
21  Fessenden and Morrill were outvoted when Congress approved the 1868 Eight Hour Act. 
See Eight Hour Act, ch. 72, 15 Stat. 77 (1868). 
22  The Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of slavery and involuntary servitude applied to 
private activity. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968). 
23  See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1572 (1867) (providing support for the 1867 
Anti-Peonage Act, including Pennsylvania Senator Charles Buckalew who agreed that the 
terms of debt service were “always exceedingly unfavorable to” the laborer and argued that 
the system “degrades both the owner of the labor and the laborer himself . . .”). 
24  For example, the 1867 Anti-Peonage Act applied to all workers in the United States, and 
the 1868 Eight Hour Act limited the hours of federal workers, who mostly worked in the 
north. See infra Section III.C. 
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eight hours a day.25 Paradoxically, then, the Reconstruction Congress enacted 
precisely the type of regulations that the Lochner era Court struck down as vio-
lating liberty of contract.26 
I. UNFREE LABOR AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT IN THE ANTEBELLUM ERA 
The right to contract has its roots in Revolutionary times when liberty re-
ferred primarily to freedom from government oppression.27 It was considered to 
be a natural right—a fundamental human right—which the government could 
not deny.28 However, even during the revolutionary era the reality of slavery 
and indentured servitude starkly contrasted with this ideology of liberty. The 
so-called “land of the free” was economically dependent on coerced labor.29 
Prior to the Civil War, our nation’s economy depended on the brutal, inhumane 
and morally unconscionable practice of chattel slavery.30 The vast majority of 
slaves were Africans or of African descent, and the institution of slavery was 
brutally racist.31 Slave masters could beat, even kill, their slaves with impuni-
ty.32 Families were separated, and children sold away from their mothers, mak-
ing it difficult for enslaved people to form lasting bonds with their loved ones.33 
Because the laws of slave states treated slaves as less than people, the slaves 
                                                        
25  See Eight Hour Act, ch. 72, 15 Stat. 77 (1868); Anti-Peonage Act, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 
(1867) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–1585 (2012) and 42 U.S.C. § 1994 
(2012)); Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1981–1983 (2012)). 
26  For example, the 1866 Civil Rights Act prohibited people entering into contracts from 
discriminating on the basis of race, the 1867 Anti-Peonage Act prohibited workers from en-
tering into contracts that imposed involuntary servitude on them, and the 1868 Eight Hour 
Act prohibited federal workers from contracting to work more than eight hours a day. See 
discussion infra, Sections III.C., III.D. In Lochner v. New York, the Court struck down a sim-
ilar law, limiting the working hours of bakers, as violating liberty of contract. Lochner v. 
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53, 64 (1905). 
27  See Randy E. Barnett, Does the Constitution Protect Economic Liberty?, 35 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 5, 5 (2012). 
28  Id. at 9. 
29  See DAVID MONTGOMERY, CITIZEN WORKER: THE EXPERIENCE OF WORKERS IN THE 
UNITED STATES WITH DEMOCRACY AND THE FREE MARKET DURING THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 13 (1993). 
30  See id. 
31  See Paul Finkelman, The Centrality of Slavery in American Legal Development, in 
SLAVERY & THE LAW 3, 5–6 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1997). 
32  See Judith Kelleher Schafer, “Details Are of a Mostly Revolting Character”: Cruelty to 
Slaves as Seen in Appeals to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in SLAVERY & THE LAW 241, 
243–44 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1997). 
33  The brutality of slavery is evident from the infamous story of Margaret Garner, a fugitive 
slave who killed her two-year daughter to prevent her from returning to slavery. R. J. M. 
BLACKETT, THE CAPTIVE’S QUEST FOR FREEDOM: FUGITIVE SLAVES, THE 1850 FUGITIVE 
SLAVE LAW, AND THE POLITICS OF SLAVERY 249 (2018). By murdering her daughter, Garner 
expressed her belief that death was preferable to slavery. Id. 
19 NEV. L.J. 447, ZIETLOW 4/25/2019  8:51 PM 
452 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:2  
lacked any civil, social, or political rights—including the right to contract.34 
Enslaved people lacked any autonomy whatsoever, and they had absolutely no 
power to redress their inhumane conditions of work. 
However, enslaved people did assert their own rights in a concrete and 
poignant manner. Thousands risked their lives attempting to escape.35 By doing 
so, they asserted their humanity and demanded fundamental human rights.36 
Fugitive slaves invoked the Declaration of Independence as they claimed the 
right to work for themselves.37 Northern free blacks and their white sympathiz-
ers supported the fugitive slaves by participating in the Underground Railroad 
to help them escape and holding mass demonstrations to stop the return of sus-
pected fugitives.38 Free blacks called for laws that would enable them to exer-
cise the right to contract along with other fundamental human rights. They de-
manded the right to be treated as citizens, with full rights equal to whites, 
including the equal right to contract.39 Fugitive slaves and free blacks alike de-
manded autonomy, but they also sought government protection, so they could 
enjoy that autonomy.40 
Chattel slaves were not the only unfree workers in antebellum America. In 
the north, thousands of workers were indentured servants, bound to their mas-
ters for a period of years and unable to leave them regardless of the conditions 
of work.41 Often, the indentured servant became further indebted, lengthening 
his term of service.42 These indentured servants could be criminally punished if 
they left before the term of servitude had expired, and the so-called “Fugitive 
                                                        
34  Slaves were treated as property, not people, and therefore lacked any human rights. See 
Jacob I. Corré, Thinking Property at Memphis: An Application of Watson, in SLAVERY & THE 
LAW 437, 437–38 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1997). The right to contract was central to antislav-
ery ideology because slaves lacked that right. See FONER, supra note 14, at 11; see also 
STANLEY, supra note 15, at xiii. 
35  BLACKETT, supra note 33, at 3–5. 
36  See id. at xv (“By their actions [fugitive slaves] contributed to a fundamental reordering 
of the world they knew and opened the possibility of joining the world as full-fledged citi-
zens.”). 
37  For example, escaped slave William Craft explained, “Having heard . . . that the Ameri-
can Declaration of Independence says, that . . . all men are created equal; that they are en-
dowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights . . . we could not understand by what 
right we were held as ‘chattels.’ ” WILLIAM & ELLEN CRAFT, RUNNING A THOUSAND MILES 
FOR FREEDOM; OR, THE ESCAPE OF WILLIAM AND ELLEN CRAFT FROM SLAVERY iii (1860). 
38  See BLACKETT, supra note 33, at 191. 
39  See, e.g., Declaration of Wrongs and Rights (Oct. 4, 1864), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
NATIONAL CONVENTION OF COLORED MEN 41, 42 (1864). (“[A]s citizens of the Republic, we 
claim the rights of other citizens. We claim that . . . proper rewards should be given for our 
services, and that the immunities and privileges of all other citizens and defenders of the na-
tion’s honor should be conceded to us . . . . and we claim our fair share of the public domain, 
whether acquired by purchase, treaty, confiscation, or military conquest.”). 
40  Id. at 56, 60. 
41  See CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 248 (1993). 
42  See STEINFELD, supra note 4, at 110. 
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Slave” Clause of Article IV obligated the return of indentured servants, as well 
as slaves, if they fled to other states.43 
Moreover, by the mid-Nineteenth Century, industrialization began to trans-
form the lives of U.S. workers. Industrial workers were less autonomous and 
had a more distant relationship with their employers. Increasingly, industrial 
workers realized that they would never be able to attain the ideal of self-
ownership and economic independence.44 “Free labor” came to mean the free-
dom from “wage slavery,” free of undue exploitation and more control over 
one’s working life.45 In the name of free labor, northern labor activists called 
for the government to regulate their employment contracts and limit their hours 
of work.46 Freedom of contract was thus mostly an illusion to millions of Unit-
ed States workers. All of these workers wanted liberty, but they also sought 
government regulation to make that liberty effective. 
A. The Right to Contract in Antebellum America 
Freedom of contract in the employment relationship was a central compo-
nent of the transition from the feudal-like system of slavery and indentured ser-
vitude in the Nineteenth Century.47 According to historian Robert Steinfeld, 
“[t]he property that masters had enjoyed for centuries in the labor of their serv-
ants now began to be reimagined as the product of a voluntary transaction 
struck between two separate and autonomous individuals.”48 Historian Amy 
Dru Stanley agreed: “In the age of slave emancipation contract became a domi-
nant metaphor for social relations and the very symbol of freedom.”49 Under 
the theory of freedom of contract, the employee himself was no longer a com-
modity but his labor was a commodity, to be sold it on equal terms with its 
buyer, his employer.50 The right to contract was premised on self-ownership.51 
A worker who enjoyed liberty of contract was entitled to the fruits of his own 
                                                        
43  See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (“No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, un-
der the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation 
therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of 
the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.”); HOANG GIA PHAN, BONDS OF 
CITIZENSHIP: LAW AND THE LABORS OF EMANCIPATION 12 (2013); STEINFELD, supra note 4, 
at 28. 
44  See TOMLINS, supra note 41, at 308. 
45  For example, the National Labor Union in 1867 called for working men to protect them-
selves against the interests of capital by cooperating with one another. MONTGOMERY, supra 
note 29, at 49. 
46  See MONTGOMERY, supra note 13, at 186. 
47  See KERSCH, supra note 11, at 137 (arguing that imagining the worker as a “free-standing, 
autonomous individual . . . from the shackles of feudalism” was “the fruit of a radically re-
formist emancipatory political project.”). 
48  STEINFELD, supra note 4, at 80. 
49  See STANLEY, supra note 15, at x. 
50  See STEINFELD, supra note 4, at 80. 
51  Forbath, supra note 12, at 783; see also STEINFELD, supra note 4, at 3. 
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labor.52 Slaves obviously lacked liberty of contract, as did indentured servants. 
Obtaining liberty of contract was the primary goal of the antislavery and ante-
bellum labor movements, but they held differing views of what that freedom 
would mean.53 
Moral abolitionists adopted the liberal ideology of contract, which “ideal-
ized ownership of self and voluntary exchange between individuals who were 
formally equal and free.”54 For example, in 1835 the Ohio Anti-Slavery Society 
resolved, “that instead of being under the unlimited control of a few irresponsi-
ble masters” freed slaves “shall receive the protection of law, that they shall be 
employed as free labourers, fairly compensated and protected in their earn-
ings.”55 Some abolitionists assumed that all workers who could enter into con-
tracts enjoyed liberty of contract.56 They did not concern themselves with the 
plight of northern workers who had the ability to enter into contracts for their 
labor.57 To those abolitionists, workers were entitled to no more than formal 
liberty of contract.58 They assumed that workers, including freed slaves, would 
eventually earn enough money to buy their own shop or farm.59 Thus, the aspi-
rations of these activists were “thoroughly middle-class.”60 
While those abolitionists viewed liberty of contract as an end in and of it-
self, members of the political antislavery movement developed a broader view 
of liberty of contract. They argued that liberty of contract meant economic in-
dependence and ownership of productive property “because such independence 
was essential to participating freely in the public realm.”61 These antislavery 
republicans saw economic independence and independence as a citizen as inter-
twined. In the Civil War era north, “the symbiotic relationship between politi-
cal and economic liberty had become an article of faith . . . .”62 During the de-
bate over slavery and emancipation, contract based on “personal volition rather 
than external force” became a metaphor for freedom.63 
Moreover, some antislavery activists saw the end of slavery as part of a 
larger movement to secure the rights of all workers, empowering them to ena-
ble them to exercise meaningful liberty of contract. For example, Ohio Repub-
lican James Ashley declared that he was “opposed to all forms of ownership of 
men, whether by the state, by corporations, or by individuals. . . . If I must be a 
                                                        
52  See STEINFELD, supra note 4, at 86. 
53  MONTGOMERY, supra note 13, at 247. 
54  STANLEY, supra note 15, at x. 
55  PROCEEDINGS OF THE OHIO ANTI-SLAVERY CONVENTION 8 (1835). 
56  Forbath, supra note 12, at 786. 
57  Id. at 784. 
58  See id. at 785–86. 
59  FONER, supra note 14, at 17. 
60  Id. 
61  Forbath, supra note 12, at 774–75. 
62  ERIC FONER, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR 104 (1980). 
63  STANLEY, supra note 15, at 2. 
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slave, I would prefer to be the slave of one man, rather than a slave of a soul-
less corporation, or the slave of a state.”64 
Unlike the moral abolitionists, these activists sympathized with the north-
ern labor movement and sought to align themselves with that movement in the 
antislavery effort.65 As Indiana Representative George Julian explained, to 
them, the labor question was “the ‘logical sequence of the slavery question.’ ”66 
Massachusetts Senator Henry Wilson connected the oppression of slaves to 
white laboring men, “we have advocated the rights of the black man because 
the black man was the most oppressed type of the toiling men of this coun-
try.”67 These advocates—all leaders in the Reconstruction Congress—looked 
not only to the experience of slaves, but also to that of northern workers as they 
developed their own vision of liberty of contract. 
B. Slaves and Free Blacks 
Because most slaves were illiterate, and because of the overwhelming op-
pression that they faced, we know little of how slaves envisioned what free la-
bor would be like. When they made it into free states, however, they found al-
lies who helped them to express their views.68 Sometimes, they chose, or were 
forced, to appear in court.69 Some slaves sued voluntarily for their freedom.70 
Others were kidnapped by slave catchers and fought their rendition in hearings 
before United States magistrates.71 They also sought government protection 
from the free states into which they escaped.72 Northern states responded with 
personal liberty laws that established procedural protections for those accused 
of being fugitives and imposed kidnapping charges on slave catchers who 
sought to return them to bondage.73 
Some fugitive slaves did have the opportunity to speak about what they ex-
pected from freedom.74 When fugitive slaves spoke, they frequently invoked 
                                                        
64  DUPLICATE COPY OF THE SOUVENIR FROM THE AFRO-AMERICAN LEAGUE OF TENNESSEE TO 
HON. JAMES M. ASHLEY OF OHIO 622 (Benjamin W. Arnett ed., 1894). 
65  See ZIETLOW, supra note 18, at 55–56. 
66  See STANLEY, supra note 15, at 61. 
67  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1866); see also Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor 
Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 440 (1989). 
68  BLACKETT, supra note 33, at passim. 
69  See LEA VANDERVELDE, REDEMPTION SONGS: SUING FOR FREEDOM BEFORE DRED SCOTT 
5, 28 (2014). 
70  Id. at 5. 
71  Id. at 71−72. See, e.g., BLACKETT, supra note 33, at 52–53. 
72  Id. at 42. 
73  See id. at 36, 75 (referring to the personal liberty laws passed by Northern states, includ-
ing laws that imposed kidnapping penalties on slave catchers). 
74  See generally CRAFT, supra note 37, at 93; J. W. C. PENNINGTON, A NARRATIVE OF 
EVENTS OF THE LIFE OF J.H. BANKS, AN ESCAPED SLAVE, FROM THE COTTON STATE, 
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both the Declaration of Independence and its promise of liberty.75 For example, 
escaped slave William Craft explained that he fled enslavement because, he 
heard the words of the Declaration of Independence were “that all men are cre-
ated equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable 
rights . . . we could not understand by what right we were held as ‘chattels.’ ”76 
“Therefore,” Craft said, “we felt perfectly justified in undertaking the danger-
ous and exciting task of ‘running a thousand miles’ in order to obtain those 
rights which are so vividly set forth in the Declaration.”77 A fugitive slave 
named Jerry agreed, pleading “in the name of the Declaration of Independence 
. . . do break these chains, and give me the freedom which is mine because I am 
a man, and an American.”78 These fugitive slaves took the Declaration of Inde-
pendence literally and demanded liberty in its most concrete terms. 
Fugitive slaves also articulated their own doctrine of free labor. Escaped 
slave J. H. Banks said: 
The slaves, moreover, not only desire, but they look confidently for the day of 
their emancipation. Nor do they expect when free to spend their time in idleness. 
They all know they will have to work, but like other men they wish to have the 
benefit of the labour of their hands. . . . Treat the labourers kindly, as men whom 
they have wronged, pay them fairly and not grudgingly, and all will go well.79 
Francis Fedric agreed, “Jus give me my freedom, and pay me for my work, 
and I work for my massa from daylight till dark.”80 These fugitive slaves 
looked forward to the day when they could enjoy the fruit of their own labor.81 
Meanwhile, free blacks asserted their own rights claims, organizing mass 
protests against the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act and crowding courtrooms in which 
accused fugitives were being tried.82 People in free black communities in cities 
such as Boston, Chicago, and Cincinnati resolved to resist the 1850 Fugitive 
Slave Act.83 They assisted fugitive slaves, and many joined the Underground 
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Railroad.84 They also formed organizations and asserted rights claims through 
official declarations.85 
In 1862, noted abolitionist and escaped slave Frederick Douglass published 
an essay, “What Shall Be Done With the Slaves if Emancipated?” In that essay, 
Douglass opined, “[o]ur answer is, do nothing with them; mind your business, 
and let them mind theirs. Your doing with them is their greatest misfortune.”86 
Douglass continued, “Let us stand upon our own legs, work with our own 
hands, and eat bread in the sweat of our own brows.”87 Here, Douglass insisted 
that blacks would work hard and succeed if they were allowed to do so.88 Con-
servatives cite this essay to claim that Douglass opposed all government assis-
tance for freed slaves.89 But this argument takes Douglass’s language out of 
context. Douglass anticipated, correctly, that southern states would enact laws 
restricting the rights of freed slaves.90 At the time, Douglass could not have im-
agined that legislatures would enact measures to help freed slaves. Here, 
Douglass opposed laws that would impose burdens on freed slaves, not laws 
that would help them. 
Two years later, in October 1864, Douglass expressed a more optimistic 
view of the power of the state to aid freed slaves. Douglass participated in the 
Colored National Convention assembled in Rochester, New York along with 
other noted black abolitionists, and joined the conference’s declaration that 
“[a]s a people, we have been denied the ownership of our bodies, our wives, 
homes, children, and the product of our own labor.”91 The declaration contin-
ued, 
[A]s citizens of the Republic, we claim the rights of other citizens. We claim 
that . . . proper rewards should be given for our services, and that [all] the im-
munities and privileges of all other citizens and defenders of the nation’s honor 
should be conceded to us . . . . and we claim our fair share of the public domain, 
whether acquired by purchase, treaty, confiscation, or military conquest.92 
These black activists made it clear that, at a minimum, they expected that 
free blacks, including freed slaves, would enjoy the right to contract. However, 
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they insisted that they would not be satisfied with “personal freedom,” includ-
ing “the right to own, buy, and sell real estate.”93 They demanded the right to 
vote and participate in the political process and called for “the blessings of 
equal liberty”—that the government would protect their rights.94 
C. Northern Workers and Freedom of Contract 
Slaves were not the only unfree workers in antebellum America. Inden-
tured servants were also bound to their masters.95 However, indentured servants 
were not slaves and were treated as persons with the right to form family rela-
tionships and enter into contracts (however unconscionable the contract may 
be) with their masters.96 Unlike slaves, indentured servants were not bound to 
their masters for life.97 Unlike slaves, indentured servants were paid wages, 
though those wages were very low.98 However, there were significant similari-
ties between indentured servitude and slavery. Like slaves, indentured servants 
had few legal rights, and lacked mobility and control over their lives.99 Like 
slaves, most indentured servants wanted to leave servitude and achieve auton-
omy.100 Indentured servants’ right to enter into exploitative one-sided contracts 
did little to improve their lives. 
As antislavery activists developed an ideology of free labor, they consid-
ered the meaning of liberty of contract for slaves and northern workers. During 
the revolutionary era, opponents of slavery had differentiated indentured servi-
tude from slavery on the ground that indentured servants voluntarily contracted 
with their masters.101 They believed that the fact that the servants had entered 
into their contracts voluntarily was sufficient to make them free.102 However, 
by the 1820s, antislavery and labor activists began to argue that both slavery 
and indentured servitude should be abolished.103 They came to believe “that la-
bor became involuntary the moment a laborer decided to depart and was not 
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permitted to do so.”104 As a result of this activism, by the 1850s, “contractual 
servitude was lumped together with slavery by free labor proponents as a form 
of involuntary servitude.”105 Thus, the antislavery movement in the early Nine-
teenth Century contributed to decline of indentured servitude in the United 
States. 
The evolution towards a doctrine of free labor coincided with the early in-
dustrial revolution in the United States, which changed the structure of labor 
and altered workers’ expectations.106 Before the industrial revolution, workers 
were largely artisanal and farmworkers, who hoped to someday own their own 
business or farm.107 Factory workers had no such illusion—they would likely 
work for wages their entire lives.108 By and large, industrial workers were no 
longer bound contractually to their employer, as indentured servants were.109 
Instead, they depended on wage labor for their livelihood.110 Industrial workers 
realized that they could not stop the degradation of work so they sought to 
“mitigate its [] effects” with campaigns for the legal regulation of hours and 
conditions of work.111 Their first priority was legislation limiting their hours of 
work.112 
The birth of industrialization also marked the beginning of the northern la-
bor movement.113 Like the leaders of the antislavery movement, labor leaders 
were inspired by the Declaration of Independence and often cited it to support 
their claims for workers’ rights. Invoking their claims, New York City Demo-
crat Tommy Walsh, who had strong ties to the labor movement, claimed that 
the Declaration “guaranteed every person who was willing to labor the right to 
do so.”114 Labor leaders also developed their own vision of freedom of contract 
and explored what the promise of liberty would mean to northern workers.115 
The antebellum labor movement’s primary goal was an eight-hour work-
day so they could have more control over their lives.116 The eight-hour move-
ment posed a challenge to advocates for liberty of contract. A law that limited 
the workday to eight hours interfered with the worker’s liberty to contract for a 
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longer work day.117 Abolitionists were generally suspicious of the northern la-
bor movement and opposed legislation that would interfere in the bargain be-
tween a worker and his employer.118 However, antislavery republicans sought 
alliances with the labor movement, and viewed the right to contract not as a 
goal in and of itself, but a means to achieve full freedom for workers.119 While 
antislavery republicans did not embrace the eight-hour movement prior to the 
Civil War, they did not view the right to contract as precluding such regulation. 
The meaning of free labor itself was evolving in the decades leading up to 
the Civil War. Under the ideology of civic republicanism, freedom entailed the 
ownership of property.120 Workers were not free unless they worked for them-
selves.121 Many members of the Free Soil, Free Labor Party also championed 
the dignity and opportunities of free labor, social mobility and “progress.”122 
They valued materialism, social fluidity and the “self-made man.”123 According 
to historian Christopher Tomlins, “[t]o the antebellum labor movement, free 
labor ideally meant economic independence through the ownership of produc-
tive property, or proprietorship.”124 This was “a far more substantive concep-
tion of contractual freedom . . . [that] the abstract formalism of mere self-
ownership would allow.”125 Labor activists argued that state intervention was 
necessary to protect workers from exploitation and enable them to exercise a 
meaningful right to contract.126 
Some northern labor activists argued that northern workers were “wage 
slave[s].”127 They argued that working for wages was as bad as slavery.128 Be-
cause like slaves, wage workers depended on another person for their liveli-
hood.129 Walsh explained that “the liberty of the white worker was only such 
liberty as the employer chose to extend to him.”130 
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Over time the argument that working for wages was tantamount to slavery 
became increasingly problematic. The economy was industrializing, and by 
1870 two-third of productive U.S. workers were earning wages.131 Labor re-
formers thus began to redefine “wage slavery” to reflect the plight of northern 
industrial workers who worked long hours under poor conditions.132 They 
sought government regulations to protect workers from wage slavery and 
formed “eight-hour” leagues to demand laws limiting the length of working 
days.133 Notable labor activist Ira Steward said, “the anti-slavery idea . . . was, 
that every man had a right to come and go at will. The labor movement asks 
how much this abstract right is actually worth, without the power to exercise 
it.”134 A Massachusetts bootmaker stated that working only eight hours made 
him feel “full of life and enjoyment” because “the man is no longer a Slave, but 
a man.”135 Historian David Montgomery said: “The struggle for shorter hours, 
in other words, was seen as a fight for the liberty of the worker.”136 These labor 
activists understood that government regulation was necessary to secure liberty 
for workers. 
Thus, in the years leading up to the Civil War, fugitive slaves, free blacks, 
antislavery advocates and labor advocates all championed an ideology of free 
labor. Freedom of contract was a crucial prerequisite to attaining free labor but 
recognizing a formal right to contract alone was not sufficient. All of these ac-
tivists called on the state to engage in protecting their right to free labor by not 
only abolishing slavery but also legislating for workers’ rights. 
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II. FREED SLAVES AND NORTHERN WORKERS AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 
The Civil War was the catalyst that brought about the end of slavery and 
the beginning of free labor. In attempting to enforce the rights of free slaves 
and aid them in their transformation to a system of free labor, the Reconstruc-
tion Congress faced a daunting task. Michigan Senator Jacob Howard described 
the experience of slaves who had just been liberated by the Thirteenth Amend-
ment during the debates over the 1866 Civil Rights Act.137 Senator Howard 
said: 
What is a slave in contemplation of American law, in contemplation of the laws 
of all of the slave States? We know full well . . . he had no rights nor nothing 
which he could call his own. He had not the right to become a husband or a fa-
ther in the eye of the law, he had no child, he was not at liberty to indulge the 
natural affections of the human heart for children, for wife, or even for friend. 
He owned no property, because the law prohibited him. He could not take real or 
personal estate either by sale, by grant, or by descent or inheritance. He did not 
own the bread he earned and ate. He stood upon the face of the earth completely 
isolated from the society in which he happened to be . . . .138 
There, Howard described the central nature of slavery—slaves were not 
treated as human beings but as property, bought and sold at the market and un-
able to engage in the market on their own. Slaves were denied the right to fa-
milial relations, isolated and bereft of family or friends.139 Slaves lacked any 
legal rights, notably including the right to travel, to testify in court, or to enter 
into contracts.140 They lacked any control whatsoever over their own lives and 
were subject to virulent racism and racially motivated terrorism.141 Freed slaves 
desperately needed an active state to protect their new right to contract. 
During the summer of 1865, southern states reluctantly ratified the Thir-
teenth Amendment but resisted its effect by enacting laws, known as Black 
Codes, which denied the liberty of contract to the newly freed slaves.142 South-
ern states used the Black Codes to impose indentured servitude on freed slaves 
and under the Black Codes, Black workers had to enter into year-long contracts 
by mid-January each year.143 Under the Codes, the doctrine of specific perfor-
mance applied to the labor contracts, so freed slaves could not leave exploita-
tive employers during the duration of their contracts.144 Many of the Black 
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Codes required artisans to seek annual licenses from district courts and subject-
ed them to penalties if they quit their jobs.145 
Black Codes also created a new class of indentured servants by requiring 
state courts to bind out orphans to work for employers chosen by the courts. 
State courts were also authorized to bind out children who were not orphans if 
the judge found that their parents lacked the means to care for them.146 South-
ern state officials also used vagrancy laws and apprenticeship systems to con-
trol the black labor force, and imposed criminal penalties on non-compliant 
workers.147 These laws imposed a system of legally compelled labor on newly 
freed slaves, effectively perpetuating slavery.148  
After slavery was abolished, freed slaves discussed what they hoped to ob-
tain from freedom. The Black Codes made it clear that freed slaves’ transition 
to freedom would not be easy, and that they would require federal intervention 
to help them. Freed slaves explained that freedom from regulation was simply 
inadequate to remedy the harm that slavery had wrought. Slaves did not merely 
lack personal liberty. Their lack of liberty enabled masters to exploit them and 
treat them poorly without any consequences. The slaves’ lack of mobility and 
autonomy enabled the master to treat them as less than a human being. To rem-
edy this harm, freed slaves called on the government to help them. 
Northern workers had been crucial to the victorious effort of the Union 
Army.149 After the War, they hoped that the end of chattel slavery would also 
improve their plight. Like the freed slaves, they called on an active state to en-
sure that they could exercise a meaningful liberty of contract.150 
A. Freed Slaves 
On November 20, 1865, leaders of the newly free black community in 
South Carolina convened a Colored People’s Convention “for the purpose of 
deliberating upon the plans best calculated to advance the interests of our peo-
ple.”151 “After five days of deliberation, this convention of newly freed slaves 
issued a resolution calling for the end of race discrimination, the right to vote, 
the right to equal citizenship, and the repeal of laws that reduced free slaves to 
‘serfdom.’ ”152 Above all else, freed slaves wanted independence from white 
control.153 They also wanted government redistribution of farm land, with some 
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claiming that they earned the right to their former owner’s land.154 Freed slaves 
also resisted the “slave crop,” cotton.155 They wanted autonomy—the ability to 
own their own land and choose their own crops.156 They valued freedom of 
movement above higher wages and sought to work less than they had as 
slaves.157 Freed slaves sought government protection of their fundamental hu-
man rights, protection which they saw as necessary to guarantee their autono-
my. 
According to historian Eric Foner, many former slaves saw freedom as an 
end to the “separation of families, punishment by the lash, [and] denial of ac-
cess to education.”158 Others stressed that freedom meant the enjoyment of “our 
rights in common with other men.”159 The right to contract was a necessary 
precondition to freed slaves’ transition from slavery to freedom. According to 
the Conference report, Black Codes deprived them of “the right to engage in 
any legitimate business” and charged that the legislature “g[ave] us no little or 
no encouragement to pursue agricultural pursuits, by refusing to sell [] us 
lands” and adopted laws that would “thrust us out or reduce us to a serfdom.”160 
These newly freed slaves asserted the right “to enter upon all the avenues of ag-
riculture, commerce, [and] trade . . .”161 They demanded action to protect them 
from the southern Black Codes that limited their freedom, including their liber-
ty of contract. 
Freed slaves wanted to be treated as full citizens, with suffrage rights, and 
they asked the federal government to protect them in the exercise of those 
rights. For example, the South Carolina Conference called for “a code of laws 
for the government of all, regardless of color” and demanded “the establish-
ment of good schools for the thorough education of our children.”162 Thus, the 
freed people of South Carolina asked for the same right to contract as enjoyed 
by white men, but they also asked for government protection to exercise that 
right. They called for the federal government to “continue the Freedmen’s Bu-
reau until such time as we are fully protected in our persons and property by the 
laws of the State.”163 Abstract rights alone were insufficient to meet their needs. 
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The measures enacted by southern state legislatures during early Recon-
struction, when Union troops protected the freed slaves’ right to vote, provide 
another insight into the vision of liberty of contract held by freed slaves.164 
Those legislatures promoted economic empowerment for freed slaves with 
measures that sometimes also benefited poor southern whites.165 According to 
Foner, “[i]n our preoccupation with the racial politics of Reconstruction[,] we 
may have overlooked the first stirring of class politics within the white com-
munity.”166 Towards the end of the Civil War, the Union-occupied city of New 
Orleans adopted pro-labor policies along with measures protecting the civil and 
voting rights of newly freed slaves.167 In 1864, the Louisiana state legislature 
established a progressive income tax, proclaimed a nine-hour workday, and a 
minimum wage.168 These early Reconstruction measures sought to regulate the 
right to contract by establishing rights for all workers. 
After the war, returning confederates used force to take over the Louisiana 
government and repealed the progressive measures of the Union-led govern-
ment.169 However, in other southern states, northern troops enforced blacks’ 
right to vote, and they elected similarly progressive governments.170 Black leg-
islatures pushed for laws granting agricultural laborers a lien on their own 
crops.171 Many southern states enacted those laws as well as progressive tax 
policies and laws making it illegal to fine planters for political reasons.172 Some 
local officials “actively sympathized with the economic plight of the [B]lack 
laborer.”173 During radical Reconstruction, state governments prioritized the 
needs of poor people and increased tax burdens on the rich.174 In 1870, a South 
Carolina Black political leader claimed that “the Republican Party is emphati-
cally the poor man’s party . . . . We favor laws to foster and elevate labor 
. . . .”175 These black Republicans sought to redefine the law of labor to protect 
both the rights of freed slaves and the white working class, using liberty of con-
tract to establish a free labor system in the southern states. 
B. Northern Workers 
After the Civil War, black workers in the south and white workers in the 
north shared concerns about a lack of control over the workplace. In the south, 
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former slaves preferred to own their own land and farm their own crops.176 In 
the north, workers preferred to own their own business, or at least have some 
say in the operation of their business.177 In this way, the interests of these 
workers coincided, as did the economic barriers that they faced. The issue of 
debtor relief, which also affected small white planters, plagued the early years 
of Reconstruction.178 In the post-Civil War north, workers were experiencing a 
decline in control over their conditions of work. The foreman, not the workers 
themselves, controlled the industrial workplace.179 The abolition of chattel 
slavery had not stopped antebellum arguments about wage slavery. 
According to historian Amy Dru Stanley, “[t]he wage slave symbolized 
selling oneself, evoking fears that the self entitlement at the heart of contract 
freedom had been lost.”180 Ira Steward, machinist and head of the Eight Hour 
League, claimed that, just as the “motive for making a man a slave, was to get 
his labor, or its results, for nothing,” so the “motive for employing wage-labor, 
is to secure some of its results for nothing; and, in point of fact, larger fortunes 
are made out of the profits of wage-labor, than out of the products of slav-
ery.”181 
Steward explained that within the system of wage labor, “freedom of con-
tract,” which ostensibly existed between employer and employee, was “neces-
sarily a sham” because of the power imbalance between workers and their em-
ployers.182 As it was before the war, the northern labor movement’s primary 
post-war goal was to obtain legislation limiting the hours of work.183 Steward 
promoted “the omnipotent power of the people when acting in their collective 
capacity” to enact legislation limiting the workday to eight hours.184 Numerous 
labor organizations called for an eight-hour work day.185 Post-war labor activity 
peaked in 1867, with a wave of strikes demanding an eight-hour work day.186 
The demands of the northern labor movement directly pitted the workers’ 
substantive vision of freedom of contract against the liberal ideology. Spokes-
men for labor, such as Ira Steward, sought legislation to enhance the workers’ 
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bargaining power.187 Other advocates for labor disagreed.188 The hardest hurdle 
to cross in the battle for the eight-hour day was “reluctance to interfere with 
freedom of contract.”189 Edwin L. Godkin, editor of The Nation and the former 
voice of radicalism, fiercely opposed the eight-hour movement because it 
would interfere with the freedom of contract.190 Godkin argued that eight-hour 
laws would interfere with the natural price of labor and would lessen produc-
tion.191 Godkin provoked fierce opposition from readers, but he was very influ-
ential.192 
Employers also wanted written contracts known as “iron-clad” agreements, 
which ban employees from joining unions and striking.193 Labor advocates 
agreed that these agreements were an “unfree” jail of labor.194 “[N]orthern 
workers argued that contracts barring collective acts were enslaving.”195 They 
pointed out the inequality in offer and acceptance, and exchange of labor for 
wage, and argued that “the blunt terms of free contracts were expressions of 
wage slavery.”196 Thus, labor activists disagreed about liberty of contract but 
many sought an active state to protect that right.197 
III. LIBERTY OF CONTRACT IN THE RECONSTRUCTION CONGRESS 
Newly freed slaves and northern workers sought measures to empower 
themselves in the workplace. They sought liberty of contract, but with the un-
derstanding that government involvement was needed to make it meaningful.198 
All of these workers sought the protection of an active state to help them earn a 
fair wage and protect them against undue exploitation. In the south, freed slaves 
sought government protection against racial discrimination and racialized vio-
lence.199 In the north, workers sought government measures that would limit 
their working hours.200 All of these workers called for government regulation 
that was necessary for them to enjoy liberty of contract, and the Reconstruction 
Congress responded. 
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There is evidence to support that the view of scholars who argue that the 
formal right to contract, adopted by the Supreme Court in Lochner v. New York 
and other cases, has its roots in the Reconstruction Era.201 It is indisputable that 
freedom of contract is a necessary precondition of free labor, and central to the 
Reconstruction effort. As we have seen, the moral abolitionist strand of the an-
tislavery movement advanced a formalist model of liberty of contract.202 That 
model influenced federal officials working in the Freedmen’s Bureaus to estab-
lish a system of free labor for the newly freed slaves.203 Moreover, it is also 
true that some Freedmen’s Bureau officials fetishized contract over the substan-
tive protections that freed slaves needed.204 
However, the vast majority of the Reconstruction Congress did not share 
the formal view of liberty of contract that the moral abolitionists advocated for. 
They understood that individual liberty of contract alone was insufficient to en-
sure that freed slaves would enjoy the fundamental rights of free persons. The 
leaders of the Reconstruction Congress wanted more than merely abolishing 
slavery and establishing a formal right to contract. Merely liberating slaves was 
not sufficient to improve their status because they were vulnerable to their for-
mer masters.205 Moreover, leaders of that Congress—including James Ashley, 
George Julian, and Henry Wilson—had long linked the plight of slaves to that 
of northern workers, viewing the end of slavery as just one step in the fight for 
workers’ rights.206 Despite the fact that landmark Reconstruction measures 
were precisely the type of regulations that the Supreme Court struck down as 
violating the liberty of contract during the Lochner Era, Reconstruction Era de-
bates over those measures are remarkably bereft of any mention of liberty of 
contract. With few exceptions, members of the Reconstruction did not view 
freedom of contract as an end in itself; they saw freedom of contract as a means 
towards their goal of establishing equal citizenship and fundamental rights for 
freed slaves and empowering all. 
A. The Historical Case for Lochnerian Liberty of Contract 
Until now, scholars have largely assumed, to the extent that there is a Re-
construction based liberty of contract, that liberty of contract limits government 
regulation of contracts. Articulating this view, Randy Barnett argues that the 
liberty of contract adopted by the Supreme Court in Lochner v. New York was 
based in abolitionist principles of free labor.207 “The right to one’s labor was 
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one’s own, they argued, and could be alienated only by consent.”208 To support 
this argument, Barnett points out that “slavery was, first and foremost, an eco-
nomic system that was designed to deprive slaves of their economic liberty.”209 
According to Barnett, “The Thirteenth Amendment prohibited slavery and the 
opposite of slavery is liberty.”210 Therefore, “[a]ny unwarranted restrictions on 
liberty—whether personal or economic—are simply partial ‘incidents’ of slav-
ery” that fall within Congress’s regulatory power under the Thirteenth 
Amendment.211 Thus, “the Thirteenth Amendment empowered Congress to 
protect the economic system of free labor and the underlying rights of property 
and contract that defined this system.”212 
Ken Kersch agrees with Barnett that the Reconstruction Era right to con-
tract limits governmental authority to regulate employment contracts.213 Both 
scholars rely heavily on the dissenters in the iconic Slaughterhouse Cases.214 In 
that case, a group of butchers challenged a New Orleans ordinance that largely 
restricted them from conducting business inside the city limits.215 The butchers 
sued under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, claiming that the law 
infringed on their constitutional right to practice the profession of their 
choice.216 The majority of the Court rejected their challenge, but four justices 
dissented.217 In his dissent, Justice Field argued that the law violated the butch-
ers’ “right of free labor, one of the most sacred and imprescriptible rights of 
man.”218 Justice Bradley made a similar argument, insisting that the “right to 
choose one’s calling is an essential part of that liberty which it is the object of 
government to protect . . . . Without this right he cannot be a freeman.”219 Jus-
tice Swayne’s dissent described the liberty to pursue an occupation to be a fun-
damental right closely related to free labor.220 In the next decades, other Justic-
es applied the same reasoning to the Due Process Clause.221 
In their dissents to Slaughterhouse, Field and Bradley—Lincoln and Grant 
appointees, respectively—articulate a broad, anti-regulatory view of freedom of 
contract for workers.222 Kersch and Barnett are correct that Field’s and Brad-
ley’s opinions reflected the moral abolitionists’ view of a formalist right to con-
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tract.223 The influence of that view can be seen in the efforts of Freedmen’s Bu-
reau officials to establish a system of free labor in the early Reconstruction 
Era.224 Those officials used the formal right to contract as a model as they 
sought to establish a system of free labor.225 However, the dissents in Slaugh-
terhouse articulate only one strand of free labor ideology from the antebellum 
and Reconstruction Era.226 As we have seen, other antislavery activists viewed 
liberty of contract more broadly, not as defining free labor, but as a means to 
achieve free labor.227 From Tom Paine to Abraham Lincoln, “freedom entailed 
ownership of productive property.”228 For freed slaves who could not afford 
property, and wage workers of all races, freedom of contract came to mean the 
right to be free of undue coercion in the workplace.229 With the Thirteenth 
Amendment, the Reconstruction Congress embraced this view by abolishing 
not only slavery, but also involuntary servitude.230 Enforcing that Amendment, 
that Congress regulated workers’ right to contract to establish a system of free 
labor. 
In Slaughterhouse, an opinion written by Lincoln appointee Justice Samuel 
Miller, the Court rejected the argument that the Reconstruction Amendments 
protected the butcher’s right to practice their trade and upheld regulations that 
have been imposed by the Reconstruction government.231 While Justice Mil-
ler’s opinion in Slaughterhouse has been justly criticized by numerous scholars 
for its narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Im-
munities Clause,232 the ultimate ruling upholding a health and safety regulation 
was consistent with the views of the vast majority of the Reconstruction Con-
gress that legislatures could regulate the right to contract. Like Justice Miller, a 
majority of the Reconstruction Congress embraced regulation and rejected a 
formalist right to contract. 
B. Freedmen’s Bureaus and the Formalist Right to Contract 
In 1865, the pressing question for the Reconstruction Congress was how to 
establish a system of free labor for the newly freed slaves that would be free of 
undue coercion.233 In the south, employers and employees had to adjust to their 
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new status of bargaining contracts.234 Many northerners believed that to be free 
meant to be free to work, and freed slaves yearned to work for themselves—not 
their former masters.235 Yet southern Black Codes and vagrancy laws limiting 
the mobility of freed slaves forced many of them to do exactly that.236 The Re-
construction Congress sought to protect Black labor from the most exploitative 
conditions in the south by creating Freedmen’s Bureaus which would enforce 
liberty of contract on the ground.237 Freedmen’s Bureau officials had the power 
to implement the new free labor paradigm in the south by protecting the freed 
slaves’ right to seek employment wherever they desired and enter into free and 
fair contracts with their employers.238 
Unfortunately, President Lyndon B. Johnson simply did not execute many 
of Congress’s Reconstruction measures.239 The president not only vetoed the 
Freedmen’s Bureau Act, but he also used his executive authority to limit the 
effectiveness of Bureau officials after Congress overrode his veto.240 President 
Johnson’s hostile attitude towards Reconstruction created tension between him 
and members of Congress, eventually sparking the failed attempt to impeach 
him.241 
However, the president was not the only reason why Reconstruction 
foundered. On the ground, Freedmen’s Bureau officials often failed to exercise 
oversight to ensure that freed slaves did not enter into exploitative contracts.242 
Those officials believed that a system of free labor required nothing more than 
freed slaves entering into contracts, regardless of the conditions of those con-
tracts.243 Even worse, many officials coerced slaves into signing contracts with 
their former masters, denying them even a formal liberty of contract.244 Freed 
slaves were understandably afraid that if they entered into contracts with their 
masters, they would be dragged back into slavery.245 Many slaves sought to 
own their own land, but attempts at land reform foundered in the Reconstruc-
tion Congress.246 Therefore, many freed slaves were forced to contract with 
their former masters.247 Most importantly, the Bureau was unable to protect 
freedmen from violence that was directed at maintaining their subservience as 
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workers.248 To a large degree, Bureau officials were absorbed by their belief in 
the liberal theory of contract and often imposed contracts on freed slaves re-
gardless of whether the contracts were fair or equitable.249 
Freedmen’s Bureaus “enforced the regime of contract,” demanding fidelity 
to contracts in labor and marriage.250 Bureau Chief General O.O. Howard as-
signed assistant commissioners to encourage planters and hired hands to sign 
contracts with one another.251 Howard initially assumed that planters would act 
in good faith and he sought to avoid paternalistic measures.252 Howard believed 
in the market to “provide[] discipline, order, and direction.”253 Under Howard’s 
leadership, some Freedmen’s Bureau officials were conscientious about their 
jobs and rejected contracts that they viewed as unduly coercive.254 Even before 
the war ended, however, many Freedmen’s Bureau officials coerced former 
slaves into signing and fulfilling annual contracts with planters in occupied are-
as of the confederacy, especially in the state of Louisiana.255 Rather than pro-
tecting freed slaves from harm, many Bureau officials focused on teaching 
them how to be autonomous actors in the labor market.256 Their goal was no 
more than a formal right to contract.257 Freedmen’s Bureau officials knew that 
southern whites were prejudiced and would try to maintain slavery.258 Nonethe-
less, they imposed contracts on freed slaves, often requiring them to sign con-
tracts with their former masters.259 
The formal right to contract that was key to Freedmen’s Bureau officials 
had its roots in abolitionist ideology. However, forcing slaves to enter into con-
tracts clearly violates even the formal right to contract.260 Moreover, the actions 
of Freedmen’s Bureau officials were inconsistent with the overall Reconstruc-
tion effort, which sought to protect the rights of newly freed slaves. The for-
malistic right to contract did little to help those freed slaves.261 To the contrary, 
the Freedmen’s Bureau officials’ fetishistic adhesion to the ideology of contract 
without protective measures severely undermined the Reconstruction effort.262 
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C. The Reconstruction Congress and Liberty of Contract 
In contrast to Freedmen’s Bureau officials, members of the Reconstruction 
Congress did not see themselves as bound by the formal right to contract. As 
they debated what liberty of contract would mean to freed slaves and northern 
workers, members of the Reconstruction Congress adopted regulations to pro-
tect their rights. At the same time as it authorized the Freedmen’s Bureau to en-
force liberty of contract in the former slave states, the early Reconstruction 
Congress also implemented a new paradigm of free labor throughout the coun-
try.263 The Reconstruction Congress had seen how former slaveholders used 
exploitative contracts to constrain their former slaves and impose indentured 
servitude on them under the Black Codes.264 They understood that only active 
intervention of the federal government could prevent this from occurring, so 
they enacted measures to protect the former slaves’ liberty of contract from that 
exploitation. 
Immediately after the Thirteenth Amendment became law, they began de-
bating legislation that would protect the right to contract for freed slaves. Re-
sponding to the Black Codes and protecting the liberty of contract for freed 
slaves was their first priority. Their first legislation, which eventually became 
the 1866 Civil Rights Act, prohibited race discrimination in the exercise of the 
right to contract and established a right “to full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens.”265 A year later, the same Congress that enacted the 1866 Civil Rights 
Act banned indentured servitude throughout the country with the 1867 Anti-
Peonage Act.266 In 1868, the Reconstruction Congress enacted an Eight Hour 
Act which limited the work day of federal workers—the primary goal of the 
northern labor movement.267 All of these measures protected the contractual 
rights of freed slaves and other workers with affirmative measures to bolster 
their bargaining power. 
The Reconstruction Congress enacted the 1866 Civil Rights Act as a re-
sponse to the southern states’ Black Codes’ restrictions on the rights of freed 
slaves.268 The primary reason for the southern Black Codes was to ensure a 
ready population of low paid and easily exploited laborers to replace the slaves 
on which the southern economies relied.269 The Black Codes did so by restrict-
ing the movement of freed slaves and requiring them to enter into indentured 
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servitudes.270 One Ohio legislator said it would be a “mockery” to “yet deny [to 
freedmen] the right to make a contract and secure the privilege and the rewards 
of labor.”271 The 1866 Civil Rights Act thus established freed slaves as citizens 
with the right to contract free of racial discrimination. 
Countering the Black Codes, the 1866 Act thus combatted both slavery and 
involuntary servitude. Opponents of the 1866 Act argued that it would “pro-
mote feud and enmity between the white employer and the black laborer.”272 In 
his veto message, President Andrew Johnson also condemned its impact on the 
southern labor structure. He explained, “This bill . . . . intervenes between capi-
tal and labor, and attempts to settle questions of political economy through the 
agency of numerous officials, whose interest it will be to foment discord be-
tween the two races.”273 By voting in favor of the Act and overruling President 
Johnson’s veto, over two-thirds of the Reconstruction Congress sided with the 
black laborers to protect their right to free labor and liberty of contract.274 
With the 1867 Anti-Peonage Act, the Reconstruction Congress responded 
to the peonage in the New Mexico territory, which, members of Congress 
pointed out, was very much like slavery.275 The 1867 Anti-Peonage Act en-
forced the “involuntary servitude” provision of the Thirteenth Amendment by 
prohibiting “the holding of any person to service or labor under the system 
known as peonage” in any place in the United States or the territory of New 
Mexico.276 The Act described peonage as “establish[ing], maintain[ing], or en-
force[ing] . . . directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or la-
bor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or other-
wise.”277 The Anti-Peonage Act prohibited both “voluntary” and “involuntary” 
servitude to empower workers and prevent them from entering into unduly ex-
ploitative contracts.278 This provision preempted the argument that peonage 
was not involuntary if workers voluntarily began the relationship, “so that there 
could be absolutely no question about the scope of the practices outlawed.”279 
Supporters of the Act claimed that it did not matter whether labor chose servi-
                                                        
270  See id. at 104. 
271  STANLEY, supra note 15, at 55–56; see also id. at 55 (“the equal right of contract was the 
nub of the [1866 act].”). 
272  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1416 (1866). 
273  Id. at 1681. 
274  But cf. NIEMAN, supra note 203, at 110 (pointing out that the southern states evaded the 
1866 Civil Rights Act by adopting race neutral anti-vagrancy laws and enforcing them only 
against blacks). 
275  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 346 (1867). 
276  Anti-Peonage Act, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867); see STEINFELD, supra note 4, at 183–84. 
277  Anti-Peonage Act, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867). 
278  Aviam Soifer, Federal Protection, Paternalism, and the Virtually Forgotten Prohibition 
of Voluntary Peonage, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1607, 1610 (2012). 
279  STEINFELD, supra note 4, at 184 (stating the anti-peonage act “marked the triumph in law 
of free labor ideas, denying to states the authority to enact legislation that might criminally 
punish breaches of labor contracts or specifically compel their performance.”). 
19 NEV. L.J. 447, ZIETLOW 4/25/2019  8:51 PM 
Winter 2018] THE RIGHT TO CONTRACT 475 
tude—what mattered was “whether the resulting condition was degrading to 
workers and employers.”280 There were few opponents of the Act, and none 
raised any concerns about the impact of the law on the right to contract.281 This 
Anti-Peonage Act thus limited the worker’s liberty of contract in order to pro-
tect the liberty of the worker from undue exploitation. 
While the 1866 Act is justly celebrated as a landmark civil rights meas-
ure,282 the 1867 Anti-Peonage Act is less well-known. However, the Anti-
Peonage Act was equally transformative. The 1867 Act “marked the triumph in 
law of free labor ideas, denying to states the authority to enact legislation that 
might criminally punish breaches of labor contracts or specifically compel their 
performance.”283 The sponsor of the Act, former Free Soiler Senator Henry 
Wilson, explained that the Act would elevate the status of all low-wage work-
ers because where peonage had been eliminated, “peons who once worked for 
two or three dollars a month are now able to command respectable wages 
. . .”284 Pennsylvania Senator Charles Buckalew agreed that the terms of debt 
service were “always exceedingly unfavorable” to the laborer, and argued that 
the system “degrades both the owner of the labor and the laborer himself.”285 
Thus, the Reconstruction Congress not only abolished chattel slavery but also 
enacted laws directed at exploitative employment practices.286 
Without Black Codes and vagrancy laws, Blacks could use “labor short-
age” to their economic advantage.287 As a result of Reconstruction measures, 
1867 to 1873 was a period of rising wages for Blacks.288 Protecting the freed 
slaves’ liberty of contract thus had concrete economic results. 
D. The 1868 Eight Hour Act and Liberty of Contract 
In 1868, the Reconstruction Congress enacted a law which established an 
eight-hour workday for federal employees.289 The 1868 Eight Hour Act re-
sponded to the northern labor movement’s complaints about wage slavery, at-
tempting to ameliorate the plight of northern workers who increasingly toiled in 
wage earning industrial jobs.290 In congressional debates, supporters of the act 
expressed the free soil ideology that they used to oppose slavery before the 
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Civil War; they also said that the Act would promote the dignity of labor.291 
Supporters of the Act argued that workers in the Union Army who had made 
sacrifices during the war were entitled to legal protections when they returned 
home.292 Opponents of the bill argued that it infringed on the workers’ liberty 
of contract.293 By approving the Act, a majority of the Congress rejected those 
arguments and accomplished a major goal of the labor movement at the time. 
The Eight Hour Act went well beyond formal freedom of contract to ensure 
that workers were truly free, that they would have time to develop themselves 
and function as full citizens of the republic. 
The 1868 Eight Hour Act was sponsored by Indiana Representative George 
Julian, a long-time activist in the antislavery movement.294 Julian was joined by 
other radical Republicans who also connected the plight of the northern worker 
with that of the newly freed slave.295 Senate supporters of the Eight Hour Act 
invoked a glorified image of the working man.296 California Senator John Con-
ness said: “I am one of those who believe . . . that toil is reputable; that it is en-
nobling; that it lends true courage. I believe that the toilers, after all, are the 
men upon whom every society that is well ordered has to rely.”297 The Act’s 
supporters also noted the military sacrifices of those in the working class.298 
They argued that the bill would improve the lives of working people and reme-
dy the perils of wage slavery.299 As Senator Conness declared, “[l]et no man 
forget, because his task is made easy in this world, the thousands, the tens of 
thousands, and the hundreds of thousands who labor and toil for an ill-requited 
compensation . . . . Make their path as easy as you can by limiting their hours 
of labor.”300 Senator Henry Wilson agreed: 
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In this matter of manual labor I look only to the rights and interests of labor. In 
this country and this age, as in other countries and in other ages, capital needs no 
champion; it will take care of itself, and will secure, if not the lion’s share, at 
least its full share of profits in all departments of industry.301 
The Act would protect these workers from “wage slavery.” The debates 
over the 1868 Eight Hour Act revealed the split between the advocates of a 
formal right to contract, and those who adhered to a more substantive model. 
Proponents of the Act viewed it as a means to enforce a meaningful right to 
free labor, but the 1868 Act arguably violated the right of the worker to con-
tract to work more hours.302 “Opponents of the [1868 Eight Hour Act] argued 
that it was a paternalistic measure that intruded on the workers’ [right to] liber-
ty of contract.”303 Conservative Republican Senator William Pitt Fessenden of 
Maine, who represented the interests of the commercial classes, claimed that 
“the bill works against the industrious, against the enterprising, against those 
who want to better their condition by work.”304 Fessenden explained, “I am op-
posed utterly to the idea of regulating hours of labor by law.”305 Republican 
Maine Senator Lot Morrill agreed that “it is a degradation of the working men 
of our country to deprive them of the privilege of making contracts to work for 
just whatever sum and for whatever time they please.”306 Morrill continued: 
I believe in leaving the people of this country at perfect liberty to make any con-
tracts they please; and as I was observing, if this should become the rule and 
custom of the country, a man with a large family, who was compelled to work 
all of his time that his strength would permit, would be unable to support his 
family . . . .307 
“[Republican] Connecticut Senator Orris Ferry agreed, saying that if he 
was a day laborer, ‘I never would consent that the Government under which I 
live should interfere either with my rates of wages or with my hours of la-
bor.’ ”308 These members of Congress articulated the Lochnerian liberty of con-
tract.309 However, they were outvoted by their peers who saw the right to con-
tract as a means to achieve full citizenship for workers.310 
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Until now, the 1868 Eight Hour Act was virtually ignored by constitutional 
scholars. The Act was limited in scope, it was never fully enforced, and the Su-
preme Court eventually struck it down as violating the right to contract.311 But 
the congressional debate over this Act shines an important light on the debate 
over the meaning of the right to contract in the Reconstruction Era. Just under 
forty years later, the United States Supreme Court struck down a similar law as 
violating the right to contract in Lochner v. New York.312 Yet the congressional 
debates over the 1868 Eight Hour Act revealed that a majority of the members 
of the Reconstruction Congress rejected the reasoning of the Lochner Court and 
voted in favor of a law that directly regulated employment contracts to protect 
the rights of workers. 
CONCLUSION 
The meaning of liberty of contracts has been central to debates over work-
ers’ rights throughout the history of our country. Even though the Reconstruc-
tion Era right to contract allows for government intervention to empower work-
ers exercising that right, the Lochnerian individualist right to contract is 
frequently invoked to oppose those measures. Yet the lost history of the Thir-
teenth Amendment and the right to contract reveals that the Reconstruction Era 
right to contract is much broader, and more robust, than that adopted by the 
Court in Lochner. Fugitive slaves, freed slaves, and northern workers, all 
sought more control over their working lives to enable them to exercise auton-
omy and the full rights of citizenship. The Reconstruction Congress responded 
to their pleas, enforcing the right to contract as a means to achieve free labor 
and effective freedom. 
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